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SUPPLEMENTAL - RELIST for 1/21/72 
No, 71-496 
Ward v. Village of Monroeville 
Cert to the Supreme Court of Ohio 
DISCUSS 
You joined Brennan's PC at the Conference on 1/14/72. 
Rehnquist has now circulated a dissent. Rehnquist does not 
disagree with Brennan's disposition on the merits; instead, he 
counsels against summary disposition, albeit in a rather strange 
Rehnquist argues that Brennan's PC "casts serious doubt on the 
validity of the tens of thousands of courts similar to that of 
Monroeville throughout the country." This is at best an unverified 
assumption; they have no figures regarding the number of such 
'---r courts in the US, and I am not sure that having this case argued 
will shed much light on this, There has been a tendency away 
from the "fee" system of handling minor traffic offenses in this 
country; in any event I am skeptical that there are more than 
20,000 such courts around. In any event, I do not understand how 
the practical impact of Brennan's PC in any way detracts from 
the conclusion that due process requires a judge who has no ini\:erest -
in seeing that convictions are obtained, , 
Rehnquist argues that 1ffiX Brennan's decision will spawn 
litigation in the form of collateral attacks on prior convictions. 
Of course this will be equally true if the Court reaches the same 
conclusion after argument. 
Rehnquist also argues that the decision fails to offer "any 
sure guide as to just when a local magistrate is, and when he is 
not, constitutionally disqualified." But this problem is inherent 
in the nature of case-by-case adjudication; indeed, it arises in 
no small part from the Constitutional requirement of a "case or 
controversy" as a predicate for adjudication, Perhaps, however, 
this concern over the1 scope of Brennan's opinion, or the constitu-
tional test involved, will cause Brennan to refine his opinion 
a bit. 
I doubt that having the case argued could effect a determination 
on the merits of this case. Argument might present considerations 
that would assist the Court in drawing the appropriate lines, but 
I doubt it. One of the hazards of broad line-drawing is that you 
inevitably decide cases which are neither presented nor contemplated, 
The test which Rehnquist criticizes is not a new one; Brennan 
merely restates verbatim the rule of Tumey Y..!. Ohio, 273 US 510 (1927). 
This proposed decision should therefore cast no more doubt on "the 
validity of the tens of thousands of courts similar" than did Tumey 
when it was decided 35 years ago. No new law is being articulated; 
the principles of Tumey are merely being applied to a different 
factual situation. 
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Re: No. 71-496 Ward v. Village of Monroeville 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me in your opinion (second draft). 
Although not of great importance, it occurs to me that the 
word 'necessarily" - as used in the next to the bottom line on page 3 -
may overstate the situation, especially in this ease where the Mayor 
in fact does not function as a normal chief executive mtmicipal officer. 
I think I would substitute "may" for ''necessarily", although I am 
content to leave this to you. 
:Mr. .Justice Brennan 




j;uprrntc (4curt cf tip• 'Pttitc~ ~tatc.a-
'J!tinafri1tgton. p. ~- 20.;ni,3 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM 0 . DOUGLAS October 27, 1972 
Dear Bill: 
In No. 71-496 - Ward v. Monroeville, 
please join me. 
W. O. D. 













~nvrmt.t <qc-urt of t4t 'J!lttitt~ ~huts 
~aslpttghm. J. <q. 21lffeJ.J,~ 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
October 27, 1972 
Re: No. 71-496 - Ward v. Village of Monroeville 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Brennan 









JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
Dear Bill, 
.:%upumt <!tcttrt cf tl7t Jtnit.dt .§tab's 
~aslringfott. gl. (!J. 21J&,)t.~~ 
October 27, 1972 
Re: No. 71-496, Ward v. Monroeville 
I am in basic agreement with your opinion for the 
Court in this case. I do, however, have some suggestions, 
perhaps because as a former Ohioan I am quite sensitive to 
the considerable impact this decision will have upon hundreds 
of villages throughout the State: 
(1) I think it is important to make clear that we 
are talking here only about adjudication and punishment in a 
litigated case where there is a not guilty plea. I would cer-
tainly not disqualify the mayor or any other village official 
from acting in a quasi-clerical capacity where there is a free 
and voluntary guilty or nolo plea, forfeiture of collateral, or 
the like. 
(2) I think it might be well to mention at the top of 
page 3 that there were dissenters from the judgment of the 
Supreme Court of Ohio. 
(3) I think it is not accurate to say in the second 
sentence of the first full paragraph on page 4 that the Mayor 
of Xenia, in the Dugan case, "had no executive but only ju-
dicial functions. " As indeed you indicate in the balance of that 
paragraph, the Mayor, as a rp.ember of the commission, had 
both legislative and executive powers. 
Mr. Justice Brennan 






~tqrrtmt <!Jou.rt o-f tltt ~ttittb ~tatt.s- . 
Jfasqingfou, ~- QJ. 2llffe~~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JusT,cE wM . J . BRENNAN, JR. October 27, 1972 
RE: No. 71-496, Ward v. Village of 
Monroeville 
Dear Lewis: 
Thank you so much for your 
suggestion that I change "necessarily" 
to "may" in the next to the bottom line 
on page 3. I am making the change be-
cause you are indeed right. 
Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely, 
4,J 
j;u.µrrmt <!toutt cf tl7 e ';nnitc~ ..§frtks 
~a.slrington, ~. <q. 2.0giJt~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL October 30, 1972 
Re: No. 71-496 - Ward v. Monroeville, Ohio 
Dear Bill: 
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CHAM BER S OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUI S T 
~u:.puuu QJ:cnrt cf tlrt 'Jjlnittb ~htltg 
~a:sJri:ttg-fott. 10. QJ:. 2llffeJ!,;l 
November 1, 1972 
Re: No. 71-496 - Ward v. Village of Monroeville 
Dear Byron: 
/ 
Please join me in your dissent. Since I am withdrawing 
my proposed concurrence, your reference to it is no longer 
necessary. 
Sincerely:r 
Mr. Justice White 




JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
$>u.t,trtutt ~irurt irf t~t 'Jffnittb ~htlts 
'Jlihtslp:11:ghm. ~- ~- 2llpJ.l.~ 
November 1, 1972 
Re: No. 71-496 - Ward v. Village of Monroeville 
Dear Chief: 
j 
I wish to withdraw the concurring opinion circulated by 
me on October 30th in this case; I intend to join the 
dissenting opinion which Byron drafted. / 
Sincerely, r 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to Conference 
,. 
' 





THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
' I' 
$5u:pumt (!Jou.rt of tfrt :!Jlnittb .:§tatta 
'Jm)'~afri:ttgfon, 1B. QJ. :WffeJ!..;t 
November 2, 1972 
Re: No. 71-496 - Ward v. Village of Monroeville 
Dear Bill: 
The exchange of memos flushes out (as John 
Harlan used to put it) aspects of this case that I confess 
I had not fully considered. Potter 1s memo, for example, 
gives rise to the question whether a judicial officer, 
disqualified because of inherent conflict of interest, may 
take a guilty plea. · In a major case such as a felony this 
would give me some problems; it may be appropriate as 
a practical matter for traffic violations, etc. 
I wonder if this aspect should be treated. 
Regards, 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBER~ OP' 
THE CHIEF" .JUSTICE 
;§uµrtmt <q:oud of tfrt 'Jllnitta ;§mug 
~aglp:ngton. J:9. <q:. 2ll.;i'l-.;t 
November 7, 1972 
Re: No. 71-496 - Ward v. Village of Monroeville, Ohio 
Dear Bill: 
This will confirm my joining your opinion in 
the above. 
Regards, 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conference 
/ 
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71-496 V ard v. Villa1 e of Monroev ille 
To: The Chief Justice 
Mr . Justice Douglas 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
Mr . Justice Whitn 
Mr. Justice ~arshall 
My. Justice Blackmun 
v,ar . Justice Powell 
Mr- Justi~ Rehnquist 
From: Brennan, J. 
2nd DRAFT irculated: \0 {'vb /J~ -
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATEi 
!3e~re~i~t~~; _ _........ ......... .i:---
No. 71-406 
Clarence Ward, Petitioner, 
V. 
Village of Monroeville, 
Ohio. 
On Writ of Certiorari to the 
Supreme Court of Ohio. 
f November - , 1972] 
MR J US'l'ICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the-
Court. 
Pursuant to Ohio Revised Code § 1905.01 et seq., which 
authorizes mayors to sit as judges in cases of ordinance 
violations and certain traffic offenses, the Mayor of 
Monroeville, Ohio, convicted petitioner of two traffic 
offenses and fin ed him $50 on each. The Ohio Court of 
Appeals of Huron County, 21 Ohio App. 2d 17, 254 
N. E. 2d 375 (1969) , and the Ohio Supreme Court, 27 
Ohio St. 2d 179, 271 N. E. 2d 757 (1971) , sustained the 
conviction, rejecting petitioner's objection that trial be--
fore a mayor who also had responsibilities for revenue 
production and law enforcement denied him a trial before 
a disinterested and impartial judicial officer as guaran-
teed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. We granted certiorari. 404 U. S. 1058-
( 1972). 
The Mayor of Monroeville has wide executive powers 
and is the chief conservator of the peace. He is pres-
ident of the village council, presides at all meetings, votes 
in case of a tie, accounts annually to the council respecting 
village finances, fills vacancies in village offices and has 
general overall supervision of village a.ff airs. A major 
part of village income is derived from the fines, forfeit-
ures, costs and fees imposed by him in his mayor's court. 
71-495-OPINION 
2 WAHD v. VILLAGE OF MONROEVII,Ll•: 
Thus in 1964, this income contributed $23,589.50 of 
total village revenues of $46.3,55.38; in 1965 it was 
$18,508.95 of $46,752.60; in 1966 in was $16,085 of 
$43,585.13; in 1967 it was $20,060.65 of $53,931.43; and 
in 1968 it was $23,429.42 of $52,995.95. This revenue 
was of such importance to the village that when legisla-
tion threatened its loss, the village retained a manage-
ment consultant for advice upon the problem."· 
iC·Ordinanrr No. 59-9: 
"WHEREAS, the legislation known as the County Court law 
passrd by thr 102nd Ge1wral A~srmhl~· grratly reduces thr jurisdic-
tional powrrs of l\foror Courts ns of .Tanuary 1, 1960; and 
"WI-IF.RF.AS, Ruch restrir1ions ma~· plare such a hard~hip upon 
hw enforcement per~onnel in this village :md f'urrounding areas as 
to endangrr the health, wclfarp and ~nfety of pcr~on: residing or 
being in our village: and 
"WHEREAS, othrr provisions of thi;; lrgislation may cause such 
a reduction in rc,·r1rne to this Yill:1gr that an additional burden may 
result from incrrasrd taxation and/or curtailment of services es-
scmtial to the health, wrlfare and safety of this village; ... 
"BE IT ORDAINED BY THE VILLAGE OF [MONROE-
VILLE] OHIO: 
"Scrtion 1. That. the sen·ices of the m:rnngement consulting firm 
of Midwest Consultants, Inrorporated of Sandusky, Ohio, be em-
ployed to rondurt a survey nnd study to nsrertain the extent of the 
effects of the County Court Law on lnw enforcement and loss of 
revenue in and to the Villnge of [Monroeville], Ohio, Fo that said 
Village ran prepare for the future opcr::ilions of the Village to safe-
guard the hC':tlth [sic], welfare and snfC't:v of its citizens .... " 
"'.\forp0,·C'r, :\fonror,·illc'~ Chirf of PoliC'e, appointed by 1he l\fa~·or, 
Ohio HeY. Code § 737.15. tC'~tifi<'rl thnt it wnF hi~ rcgul:ir pra<'1ire 
to rhar~c ~nspert~ un<lrr a Yillagr onlinnnrr·, rathC'r th:111 a st:1te 
RlatutC', whrne,·rr a c-hoirC' r.._i,trd. App., at 9. Thnt poliry mu~t 
be Yiewcd in light of § 733.40, which pro,·i<les that fines and for-
feiturr~ rolkctrd b~· the i\T:t~·or in ~1ntr en,r~ ~h:111 he paid to the 
rount~· treasury, wlwrr:1~ finC'~ and forf(•iturc" rollcctcrl in ordinance 
and traffic rnsC'~ ~h:dl be paid into tlir muniripal trea.sury. Peti-
ionpr assert~ that the .:ifo~·or ronrcded at tri:il that thiF policy was 
cnrrird out undrr 1hr i\1n~·or', ordrr~. Thr rrcord lend8 it~rlf to this 
infrrcnre. A11p., nt 10-11. 
71---1-96-0PIKION 
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Conceding that "the revenue produced from a mayor's 
court provides a substantial portion of a municipality's 
funds," the Supreme Court of Ohio held nonetheless that 
"such fact does not mean that a mayor's impartiality is 
so diminished thereby that he cannot act in a disinter-
ested fashion in a judicial capacity." 27 Ohio St. 2d 185. 
271 X E. 2d 761. We disagree with that conclusion. 
The issue turns, as the Ohio court acknowledged, on 
whether the Mayor can be regarded as an impartial judge 
under the principles laid down by this Court in Tumey 
v. Ohio, 273 U. S. 510 (1927). There, convictions for 
prohibition law violations rendered by the Mayor of 
North College Hill , Ohio, were reversed when it appeared 
that, in addition to his regular salary, the Mayor re-
ceived $696.25 from the fees and costs levied by him 
against alleged violators. This Court held that " ... it 
certainly violates the Fourteenth Amendment, and de-
prives a defendant in a criminal case of due process of 
law, to subject his liberty or property to the judgment 
of a court the judge of which has a direct, personal, sub-
stantial pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion 
against him in his case." Id., 523. 
The fact that the mayor there shared directly in 
the fees and costs did not define the limits of the 
principle. Although "the mere union of the executive 
power and the judicial power in him cannot be said 
to violate due process of law," Id., 534, the test is whether 
tho mayor's situation is one ''\Yhich would offer a possible 
temptation to the average man as a judge to forget the 
burden of proof required to convict the defendant or 
which might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear 
and true between the state and the accused .... " Id., 
532. Plainly that "possible temptation" may also exist 
when the mayor's executive responsibilities for village 
finances~ cessarlN make him partisan to maintain the 






4 WARD v. VILLAGE OF MONROEYILLE 
too is a "situation in which an official perforce occupies 
two practically and seriously inconsistent positions, one 
partisan and the other judicial, [andl necessarily in-
volves a lack of due process of law in the trial of de-
fendants charged with crimes before him." Id., 534. 
This situation is wholly unlike that in Dugan v. Ohio, 
277 U. S. 61 (1928), which the Ohio Supreme Court 
deemed controlling lwre. There the Mayor of Xenia, 
Ohio, had no executive but only judicial functions. The 
city was governed by a commission of five members, in-
cluding the Mayor, ·which exercised all legislative powers. 
A City Manager, together with the Commission, exer-
cised all executive powers. In those circumstances, this 
Court held that the Mayor's relation to the finances 
and financial policy of the City was too remote to war-
rant a presumption of bias toward conviction in prose-
cutions before him as judge. 
Respondent urges that Ohio's statutory provision, Ohio 
Revised Code ~ 2937.20, for the disqualification of inter-
ested, biased or prejudiced judges is a sufficient safeguard 
to protect petitioner's rights. This argument is not per-
suasive. First, it is highly dubious that this provision 
was available to raise petitioner's broad challenge to the 
mayor's court of this village in respect to all prosecutions 
there in which fines may be imposed. The provision is 
apparently designed only for objection to a particular 
rnayort in a specific case where the circumstances in that 
municipality might " ·arrant a finding of prejud'ice in that 
case." Village of Monroeville v. Ward, 27 Ohio St. 2d 
179,184,271 N. E. 2d 757, 760 (1971) (emphasis added). 
If this means that an accused must show special prejudice 
in his particular case, the statute requires too much and 
protects too little. But even if petitioner might have 
utilized the procedure to make his objection, the Ohio 
Supreme Court passed upon his constitutional conten-
tion despite petitioner's failure to invoke the procedure. 
71-496-0PINION 
WARD v. YILLAGB OF MONROEVILLE 5 
In that circumstance, see Henry v. M'ississippi, 379 U. S. 
443 ( 1965), he may be heard in this Court to urge that 
the Ohio Supreme Court erred in holding that he had 
not established his Fourteenth Amendment claim. 
Respondent also argues that any unfairness at the 
trial level can be corrected on appeal and trial de novo 
in the County Court of Common Pleas. We disagree. 
This "procedural safeguard" does not guarantee a fair 
trial in the mayor's court; there is nothing to suggest that 
the incentive to convict would be diminished by the pos-
sibility of reversal on appeal. Nor in any event may the 
State's trial court procedure be deemed constitutionally 
acceptable simply because the State eventually offers a 
defendant an impartial adjudication. Petitioner is en-
titled to an impartial judge in the first instance. Accord-
ingly, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Ohio is 
reversed and the case is remanded for further proceed-
ings not inconsistent with this opinion. 




To: The Chief Justice 
Mr, Justice Douglas 
Mr, Justice Stewart 
Mr, Justice Whitn 
Mr, Justice Marshall 
Kr, Justice Blackmun 
/ Mr, Justice Powell 
Mr, Justice Rehnquist 
From: Brennan, J. 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STA'ffi~lated: 
Recirculated:_:_ll_-_7.:.--7- .,:1,.----
No. 71-496 
Clarence Ward, Petitioner, 
v. On Writ of Certiorari to the, 
Village of Monroeville, Supreme Court of Ohio. /l 
Ohio. -, 
[November -, 1972] 
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
Pursuant to Ohio Revised Code § 1905.01 et seq., which 
authorizes mayors to sit as judges in cases of ordinance 
violations and certain traffic offenses, the Mayor of 
Monroeville, Ohio, convicted petitioner of two traffic 
offenses and fined him $50 on each. The Ohio Court of 
Appeals for Huron County, 21 Ohio App. 2d 17, 254 
N. E. 2d 375 (1969), and the Ohio Supreme Court, 27 
Ohio St. 2d 179, 271 N. E. 2d 757 (1971), three justices 
dissenting, sustained the conviction, rejecting petitioner's 
objection that trial before a mayor who also had re-
sponsibilities for revenue production and law enforcement 
denied him a trial before a disinterested and impartial 
judicial officer as guaranteed by the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. We granted certiorari. 
404 u. s. 1058 (1972). 
The Mayor of Monroeville has wide executive powers 
and is the chief conservator of the peace. He is pres-
ident of the village council, presides at all meetings, votes 
in case of a tie, accounts annually to the council respecting 
village finances, fills vacancies in village offices and has 
general overall supervision of village affairs. A major 
part of village income is derived from the fines, forfeit-
ures, costs and fees imposed by him in his mayor's court .. 
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Thus in 1964, this income contributed $23,589.50 of 
total village revenues of $46,355.38; in 1965 it was 
$18,508.95 of $46,752.60; in 1966 in was $16,085 of 
$43,585.13; in 1967 it was $20,060.65 of $53,931.43; and 
in 1968 it was $23,429.42 of $52,995.95. This revenue 
was of such irnporta.nce to the village that when legisla-
tion threatened its loss, the village retained a manage-
ment consultant for advice upon the problem.' 
1 Orrlin::rnre No. 59-9: 
"WHERF..AR, the l~islation known as the County Court law 
passed by the 102nd General Assembly greatly rrdures the jurisdic-
tional powers of 1\1ayor Courts as of .T anuary 1, 1960; and 
"WHEREAS, such restrictions may place such a hardship upon 
law enforcement personnel in this village and surrounding areas as 
to en<lllnger the health. welfare and s3fcty of per:;ons residing or 
being in our village; and 
"WHEREAS, other provisions of thi~ legislation may cause such 
a reduction in rev<'nue to this village that an arlditional burden may 
result from increased t:na..tion and/or curtailment of sen·ices es-
sential to the health, welfare and safely of this village; ... 
"BE IT ORDAI~ED BY THE VILLAGE OF rMONROE-
VILLE] OHIO: 
"Section 1. That the services of the management consulting firm 
of Midwest Consultants, Incorporated of Sandusky, Ohio, be em-
ployed to condurt 11 sun·ey and stndy to :1scrrtain the extent of the 
effects of the County Court Law on law enforcement and loss of 
revenue in and to the Village of [Monroeville], Ohio, so that said 
Village can prepare for the future operations of the Village to safe-
guard the health [sic], welfare and R:1fety of its ritizens .... " 
:!\IorPover, l\fonror,·ille'~ Chirf of Police, appointed b)· the Mayor, 
Ohio Re,·. Code § n7.15, tr~tificd that it \\·as his rrgulnr practice 
to charge sn.,pcet, undrr a village ordinance, rather th:rn a Rtnte 
statute, whene,·cr a rhoice existed. App., at 9. That policy must 
be Yicwed in light of § 7;33.40, which prO\·ideH thn I fi11e.; and for-
fcitmrs rolleetcd b>· tht' ~fo>·or in ~tate ca,eR shall be paid lo the 
rount:v trea~ury, \\·hcrcn~ fines :md forf<'illll"<'~ rolk•ctrd in ordill'mce 
and trafiic case's Rhall be paid into the municipal trea~ur~·- Pcti-
ioncr as.sert., that the Mayor eonrcclrd nt trial that this policy wa.s 
carried out under the l\Iayor'8 on!Pr~. Thr record IC'nds itself to this 
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Conceding that "the revenue produced from a mayor's 
court provides a substantial portion of a municipality's 
funds," the Supreme Court of Ohio held nonetheless that 
"such fact does not mean that a mayor's impartiality is 
so diminished thereby that he cannot act in a disinter-
ested fashion in a judicial capacity." 27 Ohio St. 2d 185, 
271 K E. 2d 761. We disagree with that conrlusion. 
The issue turns, as the Ohio court acknowledged, on 
whether the Mayor can be regarded as an impartial judge 
under the principles laid down by this Court in Turney 
v. Ohio, 273 F S. 510 (1927). There, convictions for 
prohibition law violations rendered by the Mayor of 
North College Hill, Ohio, were reversed when it appeared 
that, in addition to his regular salary, the Mayor re-
ceived $696.25 from the fees and costs levied by him 
against alleged violators. This Court held that " ... it 
certainly violates the Fourteenth Amendment, and de-
prives a defendant in a criminal case of clue process of 
law, to subject his liberty or property to the judgment 
of a court the judge of which has a direct, personal, sub-
stantial pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion 
against him in his case." Id., 523. 
The fact that the mayor there shared directly in 
tho fees and costs did not define the limits of the 
pri11ciple. Although "the mere union of the executive 
power and the judicial power in him cannot be said 
to violate due process of law." Id., 534, thr test is whether 
tho mayor's situation is one "which "·oukl offer a possible 
temptation to tho average man as a judge to forget the 
burden of proof required to convict the defendant or 
which might lead him not to hold tho balance nice., clear 
and true between the state and the accused .... " Id., 
532. Plainly that "possible temptation" may also exist 
when the mayor's executive responsibilities for village 
finances may make him partisan to maintain the high 
level of contribution from. the mayor's court. This too 
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is a "situation in which an official perforce occupies 
two practically and seriously inconsistent positions, one 
partisan and the other judicial, [ and] necessarily in-
volves a lack of due process of law in the trial of de-
fendants charged with crimes before him." Id., 534. 
This situation is wholly unlike that in Dugan v. Ohio,. 
277 U. S. 61 (1928) , which the Ohio Supreme Court 
deemed controlling here. There the Mayor of Xenia, 
Ohio, had judicial functions but only very limited execu-
tive authority. The city was governed by a commission 
of five members, including the Mayor, which exercised 
all legislative powers. A City Manager, together with 
the Commission, exercised all executive powers. In those· 
circumstances, this Court held that the Mayor's relation 
to the finances and financial policy of the City was too 
remote to warrant a presumption of bias toward convic-
tion in prosecutions before him as judge. 
Respondent urges that Ohio's statutory provision, Ohio 
Revised Code § 2937.20, for the disqualification of inter-
ested, biased or prejudiced judges is a sufficient safeguard 
to protect petitioner's rights. This argument is not per-
suasive. First, it is highly dubious that this provision 
was available to raise petitioner's broad challenge to the 
mayor's court of this village in respect to all prosecutions 
there in which fines may be imposed. The provision is 
apparently designed only for objection to a particular 
mayor "in a specific case where the circumstances in that 
municipality might warrant a finding of prejudice in that 
case." Village of Monroeville v. Ward, 27 Ohio St. 2d 
179, 184, 271 N. E. 2d 757, 760 (1971) (emphasis added). 
If this means that an accused must sho,v special prejudice 
in his particular case, the statute requires too much and 
protects too little. But even if petitioner might have 
utilized the procedure to make his objection, the Ohio 
Supreme Court passed upon his constitutional conten-
tion despite petitioner's failure to invoke the procedure. 
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In that circumstance, see Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U. S. 
443 ( 1965), he may be heard in this Court to urge that 
the Ohio Supreme Court erred in holding that he had 
not established his Fourteenth Amendment claim. 
Respondent also argues that any unfairness at the· 
trial level can be corrected on appeal and trial de nova 
in the County Court of Common Pleas. We disagree. 
This "procedural safeguard" does not guarantee a fair-
trial in the mayor's court; there is nothing to suggest that 
the incentive to convict would be diminished by the pos-
sibility of reversal on appeal. Nor in any event may the-
State's trial court procedure be deemed constitutionally 
acceptable simply because the State eventually offers a 
defendant an impartial adjudication. Petitioner is en-
titled to a neutral and detached judge in the first in-
stance.2 Accordingly, the judgment of the Supreme 
Court of Ohio is reversed and the case is remanded for 
further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered .. 
2 The question presented on this record is the conslitutionality of 
the Mayor's participation in the adjudication and punishment of a 
defendant in a litigated case where he elects to contest the charges 
ngain~t him. We intimcltc no view that it would be unconstitutional 
to permit a mayor or similar official to serve in essentially a minis-
terial cclpacity in a traffic or ordinance violation case to accept a 
free and voluntary plen of guilty or nolo contendel'e, a forfeiture of 
collateral, or the like. 
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To: The ·etuef J'as uice 
Mr , Justice Douglas 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
Mr. Justice WhitA 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
2nd DRAFT 
/ Mr . Justice Powell 
Mr, Justice Rehnquist 
SUPREME COURT O:F THE UNITED STATESFrom: Br~'1nan, J. 
CLARENCE WARD v. VILLAGE OF MONROE- Circulated:_!....:/ ~ -~;;1.-=-k_·,,-'-I -
VILLE. OHIO 
ON PETITION FOR WlU'l' OF CERTIORARI TO THE SllPREl\rn 
)eC"idL'd .Ta nun rr - 1072 
PER Ct:m 
The Mayor of Monroeville, Ohio, found petitioner 
guilty o~ traffic offenses and fined him $50 on each. 
Tho Mayor sat as .1uclgc pursuant to Ohio Revised Code 
1D03.01 et seq. \\"hich authorizrs '.\fayors of Ohio munici-
palitirs to do so in casrs of ordinance violation and 
certain traffic offe11;e:rs. The Ohio Cotirt of Appeals of 
Uuron County, 21 Ohio App. 2d 17, 254 N. E. 2d 375 
( Hl6fl) , and thr Ohio Supreme Court, 27 Ohio St. 2d 179. 
271 X. E. 2d 757 (Hl71), sustained the conviction. Those 
courts rejectrd petitioner's contention that trial brfore a 
~'vfayor ~d10 also had rrsponsibilities for rrvenue )ro-
d uction and la"· en orccment c rnied him a trial before 
~~stecTancl impartia1 judiciaTofficer as guaranteed 
hy the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amrndment. 
Tho Mayor of Monroeville has "·ide executive 1)0\\'0rs 
and is the chief conservator of the peace. Ile is pres-
ident of the village council , presides at all meetings, votes 
in case of a tic, accounts anually to the council ro'-pocting 
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village finances, fills vacancies in village offices and has 
general overall supervision of village affairs. A major I 
part of village income is derived from the fines, forfeit-
ures, costs and fees nnposod15y !urn 111 his Mayor's court. 
r lUS in 1964. this income contrffrntecl $23,580.5-() -of 
total village revenues of $46,3i55.38; in HJ65 it was 
$18,508.95 of $46.752.GO; in Hl66 in \\"as $16,085 of 
$43,58.:5.13; in 1967 it mis $20,060.65 of $53,931.43; and 
in 1968 it was $23,429.42 of $52,995.95. This revenue 
,ms of such importance to tho village that \\'hen legisla-
tion threatened its loss, the village retained a manage-
l 
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mcnt consultant for advice upon the problem.~· The 
Ohio Suprernc Court held that " ... even though the 
revenue proclucC'd from a mayor's court provides a sub-
stantial portion of a rnunicipality's funclia:, such fact doc 
not mean that a mayor's impartiality is so diminished 
tliC'reby that he cannot act in a clisintcre::;tcd fashion i11 
a judicial capacity." 27 Ohio St. 2d - , 271 ~. E. 2d 
\Ye disagree with the Ohio Supreme Court. That 
court arKno\\·lcdged that the lSSUC turns 011 whether the 
::vlayor can bC' regarded as an impartial juclgC' under the 
principlC's laid clom1 by this Court in Tumey v. Ohio, 
273 C S. 510 (1027). There convictions for prohibition 
law Yiolations rC'll(lrrecl by the Mayor of North College 
Hill, Ohio, WC're reversed when it appeared that, in addi-
tion to his rC'gular 1-alary, the Mayor received $696.25 
from the frC's and costs levied by him against alleged 
viola.tors. This Court held ". . . it certainly violates 
thC' Fourteenth ArnC'nclmcnt, and deprives a cldendant 
in a criminal case of clue process of la"·· to subject his 
•:·Ordinanrr No. 59- 9: 
"WHEREAS . 1hr lcgi~lalion knmrn as thr Counl~· Court law 
p:1~;,rd b:v thr 102nd Grnrrnl A~~rmhJ~, grratJ~, rrclurr, the jurisclic-
1ional power,; of :i\f:1~·or Court8 :i s of Januar~· 1. 1960 ; :rnd 
"\YllEREAS, St1<'h rr~trirtions ma~· place surh a hnrd~hip upon 
law rnforermrnt prr,onnd in thi,; village :md RlllT01111cling arrfls a~ 
to rncbngrr thr hralth, \\·rlfnrr and ~afrly of prr~ons residing or 
bring in om vill:1gr; and 
"WITEREAS, othrr provi~ions of t hi~ lrgislnt ion m:iy rauRc snrh 
a rrdurtion in rr,·rnur to this Yillagr that an additional burden m:iy 
mmlt from inrrcnsrd t:1xation and/ or rurt:1ilmrnt of srrvicrR r~-
sC'ntial to the health, wrlfarr and ~flf{'(y of this dingo ; . . . 
"BE IT ORDAnED BY THE YILLAGE m [".\TONROE-
\'ILLE] OIIIO: 
"Section 1. Thnt thr ~rn·irr,; of the mflnflgrmrnt ronRulting firm 
of Midwest Con~ul1nntR, Inrorporntcd of Randu~ky, Ohio, be rm-
plo~·cd to rondurt fl Run·ry and study to ascrrtnin the extent of thC' 
rtTrrt ,; of thr Count)· Court Law on In,,· rnforermrnt nncl lo~s of 
ronnne in and to 1hr Village of [Monroeville] , Ohio, so that sflid 
Yillngr rfln prrparr for tho future operations of the Village to safc-
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liberty or property to the judgment of a court the judge 
of which has a direct, g£!J9JJ_al, substantial pecuniary 
interest in reaching a conclusion against him in his case." 
Id., 523. But the fact that the Mayor there shared di-
rectly in the fees and costs did not define the limits of 
the principle. Although "the mere union of the execu-
tive power and the judicial power in him cannot be said 
to violate due process of law," Id., 534, the test is whether 
the Mayor's situation is one "which would offer a possible 
temptation to the average man as a judge to forget the 
burden of proof required to convict the defendant or 
"·hich might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear 
and true between the state and the accused .... " Id., 
532. Plainly that "possible temptation" may also exist 
when the Mayor's executive responsibilities for village 
finances necessarily make him partisan to maintain the 
high level of contribution from the Mayor's court. This 
too is a "situation in which an official perforce occupies 
two practically and seriously inconsistent positions, one 
partisan and the other judicial, [ and] necessarily in-
volves a lack of due process of law in the trial of de-
fendants charged with crimes before him." Id., 534. 
This situation is wholly unlike that in Dugan v. Ohio, 
277 U. S. 61 (1928), which the Ohio Supreme Court 
deemed controlling here. There the Mayor of Xerna, 
Ohio, had no executive but only judicial functions. The 
city was governed by a commission which exercised all 
legislative powers. A City Manager, together with the 
Commission, exercised all executive powers. In these 
circumstances, this Court held that the Mayor's relation 
to the finances and financial policy of the City was too 
remote to warrant a presumption of bias tm-vard con-
viction in prosecutions before him as judge. 
Respondent urges that Ohio's statutory provision, Ohio I 
Revised Code 733.24, for the disqualification of interested, 
biased or prejudiced judges is a sufficient safeguard to 
protect petitioner's rights. This argument is not per-
suasive. First, it is highly dubious that this provision 
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,ms available to raise petitioner's broad challenge to the 
Mayor's court of this village in respect of all prosecutions 
there in which fines may be imposed. The provision is 
apparently designed only for objections to a particular 
mayor "in a specific case where the circumstances in that 
municipality warrant a finding of prejudice in thal case." 
\'illage of M omoeville v. TV ard, 21 Ohio App. 2d 17, 254 
N. E. 2d 375, - (Hl71) (emphasis added). If this 
means that an accused must show special prejudice in 
his particular case, the statute requires too much and 
protects too little. But even if petitioner might have 
utilized the procedure to make his objection, the Ohio 
Supreme Court passed upon his constitutional conten-
tion despite petitioner's failure to invoke the procedure. 
In that circumstance, see Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U. S. 
443 ( 1965), he may be heard in this Court to urge that 
the Ohio Supreme Court erred in holding that he had 
not established his Fourteenth Amendment claim. 
Respondent also argues that any unfairness at the 
trial level can be corrected on appeal and trial de nova 
in the County Court of Common Pleas. We disagree. 
Apart from the fact that Tuniey was decided despite 
the availability of some review, when that case was 
decided, 273 U. S., at 517, certainly this "procedural 
safeguard" docs not guarantee a fair trial in the 
mayor's court; there is nothing to suggest that the 
incentive to convict would be diminished by the possi-
bility of reversal on appeal. Nor in any event may the 
State's trial court procedure be deemed constitutionally 
acceptable simply because the State eventually offers a 
defendant an impartial adjudication. Petitioner is en-
titled to a fair trial and an impartial judge in the first 
instance; the State may not erect formidable procedural 
barriers which require a defendant either to accept an 
unjust punishment or to relegate himself to the delay 
and expense of appeal. 
The petition for certiorari is granted and the judgment 
of the Supreme Court of Ohio is 
Reversed. 
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